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POOL

COMMENT
An End to Grazing Lease Litigation:
An Examination of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Schemes
that Could Resolve the Overgrazing Dispute
on State and Federally Owned Rangelands
in the Western United States
JAMIE RYAN POOL ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ranching of cattle and other animals in the western United
States (U.S.) has traditionally been considered the “backbone” of
many rural areas and communities. 1 Ranchers have grazed their
livestock on vast rangelands since the 1500s in the southwestern
U.S. and since the 1800s elsewhere in the West. 2 Until 1891, the
federal government primarily sought to “dispose” of public lands
through “[giving] or [selling] millions of acres of the public
domain to homesteaders, railroads, and new states, among
others.” 3 Even with this disposal of lands, a rancher could
generally graze his livestock wherever he wished, as long as it
was on public land. 4 In 1934, Congress passed the Taylor
Grazing Act, 5 which regulated grazing on public rangeland by
requiring that ranchers first obtain exclusive grazing permits for
∗
Jamie Ryan Pool is a 2011 J.D./M.E.M. joint-degree candidate attending
Pace Law School and Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. This
article is dedicated to the memory of his stepmother, Cindy Pool.
1. Julie Andersen, Note, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Herding Ranchers
Off Public Land?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1273 (2000).
2. Bruce M. Pendery, Reforming Livestock Grazing on the Public Domain:
Ecosystem Management-Based Standards and Guidelines Blaze a New Path for
Range Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 513, 515 (1997).
3. Id. at 519.
4. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1273.
5. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (2006).
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portions of federal land. 6 The Taylor Grazing Act, along with the
later Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 7 and the
Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 8 granted the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to develop and promulgate
these regulations on public rangeland. 9 Because of the former
federal land disposal policy and the later regulation of grazing on
public land, modern grazing generally takes two different forms:
(1) grazing on state owned land; and (2) grazing on federal land
administered by the Bureau of Land Management or the U.S.
Forest Service.
In the western U.S., ranching often requires large areas of
public rangeland because landowners collectively own only a
small portion of each state as private property. As a result,
ranchers often lease or obtain permits for additional portions of
public rangeland to augment the land area that will support their
livestock. As of January 1, 2006, in Arizona for example, 86% of
the state was suitable for livestock grazing and only 16% of this
land was privately owned. 10 However, in order to increase
profitability and compete with others, ranchers have tended to
increase their herd sizes to the point that they overgraze and
damage the rangeland ecosystem. 11 Consequently, public land’s
ability to sustain native flora and fauna has decreased. 12
Environmental organizations, observing this decline in the
ecosystem, argue that grazing causes significant environmental
damage. They want livestock either removed from public land
that has been overgrazed or at least reduced in number. 13 On
both state and federally owned rangeland, environmental
6. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1273.
7. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011785 (2006).
8. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908
(2006).
9. See generally Pendery, supra note 2, at 515, 519-22.
10. ARIZ. COOP. EXTENSION, COLL. OF AGRIC. & LIFE SCIS., UNIV. OF ARIZ., BEEF
CATTLE ON ARIZ. RANGELANDS: RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND FACILITIES DEDICATED
TO
PRODUCING WHOLESOME FOOD 4 (2007), http://cals.arizona.edu/
extension/marketing/outreach_materials/beef_cattle.pdf.
11. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing,
http://www.onda.org/protecting-wildlife-and-clean-water/public-lands-grazing
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1274.
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organizations have pursued a strategy of both participation in
grazing lease auctions and, when that does not work, litigation to
remove or reduce livestock from public land. 14 This litigation has
tended to be time-consuming, is costly to the administrative
agencies managing public lands, 15 and has created an extremely
hostile public and legislative reaction to the environmental
organizations and their interests. 16
This comment will discuss the litigation associated with
environmental organizations’ attempts to out-bid ranchers and
ranching associations for public grazing leases on state and
federally owned rangeland in the western U.S. Section II of this
comment will examine the history of state and federally owned
rangeland and its auction process. Section III will discuss several
environmental organizations and their interests in rangeland
protection, and Section IV will describe the grazing lease
litigation problem in detail. Section V will analyze the negative
legislative and agency reactions to environmental organizations’
legal victories. Finally, in Section VI, this comment will propose
state and federal legislation and agency regulatory changes
designed to encourage the adoption of alternative dispute
resolution techniques to reduce or eliminate western grazing
lease litigation.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PUBLIC GRAZING
LAND
There is a great deal of public rangeland throughout the
western U.S. that is used by ranchers and ranching associations
to graze livestock. The U.S. granted some of this rangeland to
individual states when they were admitted into the Union. The

14. See Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); Idaho Watersheds
Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 918 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 1996) [hereinafter
IWP I] (illustrating representative grazing rights litigation).
15. See Stacey Allison, Comment, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: Implications for Leasing State Trust Lands to Environmental Organizations and
Other High Bidders, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 39, 49-50 (2004).
16. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS: FOREST GUARDIANS SETS ITS
SIGHT ON NORTHEASTERN ARIZONA STATE GRAZING LEASE—SAYS IT WILL NOT PAY
FOR IMPROVEMENTS THAT WERE NOT PAID FROM PERSONAL FUNDS (2008),
http://www.azcattlemensassoc.org/documentz/apr2008/KnightsGrazingLawsuitL
ong.pdf [herinafter ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N BIDDING WARS].
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federal government owns the rest, which is administered by
various federal agencies.
A. State Managed Rangeland
It was federal policy to dispose of public domain land until
1891, 17 when the federal government shifted to retaining much of
When
it for internal management and administration. 18
expanding the Union westward, Congress had to determine
whether the federal government or new state governments should
retain ownership of the public domain land comprising much of
the western territories. 19 In the end, millions of acres of public
domain land were granted to the new states so that any sale or
lease revenues generated from them would support the
establishment and maintenance of state public schools. 20 Two
states in particular are home to prodigious litigation by
environmental organizations regarding grazing leases on these
school lands—Arizona and Idaho.
In Arizona, state owned rangeland is any land entrusted to
the state under the Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act (Enabling
Act). 21 As mentioned above, Congress reserved much of this land
to support state public schools. 22 Historically, Arizona
accomplished this objective through the sale or auction of grazing
leases on the land. 23 The Enabling Act prohibited any sale or
lease of the school-trust land unless it was to the “highest and
best bidder at a public auction.” 24 In light of the dissipation of
17. Pendery, supra note 2, at 519.
18. Id. at 520.
19. See Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, 61st Cong., ch. 310, §§ 24-25, 28,
36 Stat. 557, 572-76 (1910) (amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling
Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997)); see also An
Act To Provide For The Admission Of The State Of Idaho Into The Union, 51st
Cong., 656-57 (1890) (no current effective sections).
20. Id.
21. Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, 61st Cong., ch. 310, §§ 24-25, 28, 36
Stat. 557, 572-76 (1910), amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling Act
Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997).
22. Id. § 25.
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-132(A)(5)-(6) (2008).
24. Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 557, 574 (1910),
amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling Act Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997).
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land assets granted to other states after their admission into the
Union, 25 Congress specifically wrote the Enabling Act so that it
would “severely circumscribe the power of the state government
to deal with the assets of the common school trust.” 26 Members of
Congress were upset that corrupt state legislatures had
permitted the disposal of school lands in ways that did not raise
the money necessary to support public schools. 27 The Arizona
Constitution adopted by reference large sections of the Enabling
Act, 28 and the Arizona Legislature drafted laws that provided for
the administration of the school-trust lands by the Arizona State
Land Department (SLD) pursuant to the Arizona Constitution. 29
Under Section 37-102 of this legislation, the SLD was tasked
with administering “all laws relating to lands owned by,
belonging to, and under the control of the state.” 30 Therefore, the
SLD is in charge of the school-trust land granted to the state
under the Enabling Act. In performing its administrative duties,
the SLD subsequently classified much of the school-trust land as
land suited only for grazing because it had “no other practicable
use.” 31 In order to support the public schools of Arizona, the SLD
leases the land classified for grazing to ranchers through a public
auction process, which raises revenue for the maintenance of the
schools. 32 The Commissioner of the SLD, as provided by statute,
awards the leases to the “highest and best bidder.” 33
Idaho state rangelands have a similar history to those of
Arizona. Congress granted these rangelands to Idaho in the
Idaho Admission Act (Admission Act), 34 mandating that the
rangelands be “disposed of only at public sale, the proceeds to
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only
25. Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 747 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. 1987).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ARIZ. CONST. art. X, §§ 1-11.
29. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-102(A),(B),(F) (2008).
30. Id. § 37-102(A).
31. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 370-71 (Ariz. 2001) (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37-101(7) (2001), to define “grazing lands”).
32. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 366 (Ariz. 2001).
33. Id. at 371 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. X, § 8).
34. An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Idaho into the Union,
51st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 656-57, 26 Stat. 215, 216 (1890) (no current effective
sections).
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shall be expended in the support of said schools.” 35 These lands
could, however, be leased for ten-year periods. 36 As in Arizona,
the Idaho Constitution incorporated the school land grants
specified in the Admission Act. 37 Idaho man-dates that any
earnings from the school-trust lands be used to maintain state
The Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners
schools. 38
(SBLC), as provided for by Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, 39
is charged with providing for “the location, protection, sale or
rental of all the lands” of the public school land endowment. 40
B. Federally Managed Rangeland
For grazing lease litigation purposes, federal public land can
be divided into two general categories—that administered by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and that administered by
the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service). The BLM is an
administrative unit of the Department of the Interior, 41 and the
Forest Service is an administrative unit of the Department of
Agriculture. 42 Each agency is responsible for vast expanses of
land owned by the federal government. 43
The BLM is “responsible for the majority of federallymanaged rangeland,” 44 and even though some grazing occurs on
National Forest System land, “grazing is most commonly
associated with the BLM.” 45 The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
(TGA) was the first federal legislation that substantially
regulated grazing on most non-Forest Service federal public land.
35. Id. § 5.
36. Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles As a Tool for Grazing
Reform: Learning from Four State Cases, 33 ENVTL. L. 341, 360 (2003).
37. Id. at 359-60.
38. Id.
39. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 7.
40. Id. § 8.
41. Bureau of Land Management, About the BLM, Detailed History, BLM
and Its Predecessors, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM/History.
html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
42. U.S. Forest Service, About Us—Meet the Forest Service, http://www.fs.
fed.us/aboutus/meetfs.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
43. Id. See also Bureau of Land Management, supra note 41.
44. Scott Nicoll, The Death of Rangeland Reform, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 47,
61 (2006).
45. Id.
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The TGA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to establish
grazing districts 46 and issue “permits to graze livestock on such
grazing districts.” 47 However, the regulation and adjudication
processes under the TGA were unwieldy and somewhat limited
the Act’s effectiveness. 48 The Interior Department created the
BLM itself in 1946 to streamline some of this regulation and
adjudication. 49
Thirty years later, Congress rectified some long-standing
problems with the TGA by passing the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) 50 to provide the BLM with the
statutory authority to manage public rangeland within its
jurisdiction similar to that enjoyed by the Forest Service. 51 In
addition, Congress required in FLPMA that the BLM manage
public rangeland “under principles of multiple use and sustained
yield” 52 so that many types of scientific, recreational, and
environmental non-use values could be protected. 53
Concerned that FLPMA did not do enough to protect
rangeland resources, Congress in 1978 enacted the Public
Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA). 54 Under PRIA, Congress
determined that “vast segments of the public rangelands [were]
producing less than their potential for livestock, wildlife habitat,
recreation, forage, and water and soil conservation benefits, and
for that reason [were] in an unsatisfactory condition.” 55 Congress
then reaffirmed the national policy of managing, maintaining,
and improving the condition of federal public rangelands so that
they would “become as productive as feasible for all rangeland

46. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1274 (citing LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE
WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING (1992)).
47. Id. at 1277.
48. See id. at 1278.
49. See Bureau of Land Management, supra note 41.
50. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1787
(2006).
51. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1279.
52. 43 U.S.C § 1732(a) (2006).
53. Id. § (a)(8).
54. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908
(2006).
55. Id. § 1901(a)(1).
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values in accordance with management objectives and the land
use planning process established” under FLPMA. 56
Forest Service rangeland, like that administered by the BLM,
has a complicated regulatory history. In 1891, Congress passed
the Forest Reserve (Creative) Act, 57 which granted thenPresident Harrison authority to establish Forest Reserves out of
the public domain land. 58 Harrison used the authority to reserve
about thirteen million acres, although the designations only
amounted to largely ceremonial map demarcations because
Congress provided no funding for federal management. 59 In
1897, Congress finally provided this funding and stated that
“[national forests shall not be established except to] protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.” 60 In 1905, Congress, at the urging of Europeantrained forester Gifford Pinchot, 61 “transferred the forest reserves
to the Department of Agriculture, named them national forests,
and created the Forest Service to manage them.” 62 Under
Pinchot, 63 one of the Forest Service’s central purposes became the
commercial sale of timber to avoid potential future timber
shortages. 64 The practice of encouraging commercial timber sales
continued until 1960 when Congress passed the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY). 65 MUSY was designed to promote
the protection of “recreation, wildlife, and fish and range

56. Id. § 1901(b)(2).
57. Rebecca Smith, Lands Council v. Powell and the Ninth Circuit’s Refusal
to Blindly Defer to Unreliable Forest Service Science, 28 PUB. LAND & RES. L.
REV. 65, 69 (2007).
58. Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act:
Judicial Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 53, 57 (1994).
59. Id.
60. Public Law Appropriations, Sundry Civil Lieu Lands Act (Forest
Reservations), 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006).
61. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 58.
62. Id. at 57-58; Transfer Act of 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 472 (2006)).
63. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 58.
64. Id.
65. Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2006).
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resources” in addition to general timber management. 66 In 1976,
Congress passed the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). 67
Under NFMA, Congress required that the Forest Service begin a
“nationwide forest planning process for each of the 156 separate
units of the National Forest System.” 68 The forest plans resemble
zoning maps, and they are used to divide all of the National
Forests into different “Management Areas.” 69 Forest plans also
contain many procedural “standards and guidelines that control
the types of activity that may occur” 70 within each Management
Area. Some areas are zoned for “wildlife winter range, riparian
areas, semi-primitive recreation, and timber production/wildlife,”
in addition to other uses. 71 One of those other uses happens to be
livestock grazing.
Contrary to what one might expect, the Forest Service has
long considered livestock grazing a legitimate and reasonable
use. 72 Since 1897, Congress has allowed the Forest Service to
control the permits, herd size, allotments, and season of use in
order to prevent any monopolization of rangeland by large
commercial grazing operations. 73 Current Forest Service
regulations recognize that it continues to be the “policy of
Congress that the National Forests are established and shall be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes,” 74 and that the policy requires
that the Forest Service “develop, administer and protect the
range resources and permit and regulate the grazing use of all
kinds and classes of livestock on all National Forest System lands
and on other lands under Forest Service control.” 75 Currently,
the Forest Service divides land available for grazing into
66. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 59.
67. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2006).
68. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 65.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rangelands, Why does the forest
service permit livestock grazing on NFS land?, http://www.fs.fed.us/range
lands/uses/allowgrazing.shtml (last visited on Oct. 26, 2009).
73. Id. (citing WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, FOREST SERVICE GRAZING AND RANGELANDS: A HISTORY (1985)).
74. Id.
75. 36 C.F.R. § 222.1(a) (2009).
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“Grazing Allotments” 76 and permits grazing on them only after
the development of an “Allotment Management Plan” (AMA). 77
These plans “prescribe the manner in and extent to which
livestock operations will be conducted in order to meet the
multiple-use, sustained yield, economic, and other needs and
objectives as determined for the lands involved.” 78 Each AMA
takes into account what uses are both appropriate and feasible,
and any subsequent grazing is “planned and managed taking into
consideration all the other uses of the area.” 79
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR
INTERESTS IN PUBLIC RANGELAND
Because of the perceived environmental damage caused by
overgrazing, many organizations have formed to promote healthy
grassland ecosystems by litigating issues involving grazing
leases.
These organizations operate predominately in the
western U.S. where overgrazing is most prevalent. Especially
successful organizations include WildEarth Guardians, the
Western Watersheds Project, the Center for Biological Diversity,
and the Oregon Natural Desert Association.
A. Rangeland Protection Organizations
WildEarth Guardians is a nonprofit organization based out of
Santa Fe, New Mexico. 80 Once known as Forest Guardians, it
merged with Sinapu, another regional environmental organization, and changed its name in 2008. 81 The new organizational
structure enabled WildEarth Guardians to expand its activities to
areas in the western U.S. outside of Arizona and New Mexico, 82
and it now maintains offices in Arizona, Montana, Colorado, and
76. Id. § 222.2(a).
77. Id. § 222.2(b).
78. Id. § 222.1(a)(2)(i).
79. Id.
80. WildEarth Guardians, Meet Our Staff, http://www.wildearthguardians.
org/AboutUs/MeetOurStaff/tabid/95/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
81. WildEarth Guardians, Conservation Groups Merge to Create a Force for
the American West’s Wild Places, Wildlife, and Wild Rivers, http://www.wild
earthguardians.org/library/paper.asp?nMode=1&nLibraryID=590 (last visited
Oct. 26, 2009).
82. Id.
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California. 83 WildEarth Guardians, in its mission statement,
purports to “[protect] and [restore] wildlife, wild rivers, and wild
places in the American West.” 84 WildEarth Guardians’ wildlife
program aims to “[prevent] extinction and [promote] recovery of
imperiled native plants and animals in the West,” 85 and the
organization advocates federal endangered species listing for
those species at risk because of habitat loss caused by “logging,
mining, livestock grazing, [and] oil and gas extraction.” 86
WildEarth Guardians monitors federally listed species to ensure
that any protective measures are effective. 87 The organization’s
wild places program is dedicated to protecting “public and private
land from destruction and restores previously damaged areas
throughout the West.” 88
The Western Watersheds Project (WWP) is a “non-profit
conservation group founded in 1993 with 2000 members and field
offices in Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona and
California.” 89 WWP began as the Idaho Watersheds Project
(IWP) and is based in Hailey, Idaho. 90 IWP was so successful in
grazing lease litigation in Idaho during the 1990’s that it changed
its name to WWP and expanded operations to other states. The
organization’s goal is to “influence and improve public lands
management in [eight] western states with a primary focus on
the negative impacts of livestock grazing on 250,000,000 acres of
western public lands.” 91 To accomplish this goal, WWP has
actively participated with WildEarth Guardians, the Center for
Biological Diversity, and the Oregon Natural Desert Association

83. WildEarth Guardians, Meet Our Staff, supra note 80.
84. WildEarth Guardians, WildEarth Guardians, http://www.wildearthguard
ians.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
85. WildEarth Guardians, Wildlife, http://www.wildearthguardians.org/Wild
life/tabid/66/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. WildEarth Guardians, Wild Places, http://www.wildearthguardians.org/
WildPlaces/tabid/72/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
89. Western Watersheds Project, About WWP, Mission and Partnerships,
http://westernwatersheds.org/about (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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in jointly bringing lawsuits to prevent overgrazing and grazing
lease awards for individuals that habitually permit overgrazing. 92
The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is a non-profit
membership organization based in Tucson, Arizona. 93 It has
approximately 200,000 active members 94 and has field offices in
Alaska, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, D.C. 95 CBD has used
evidence of “cattle-grazing abuses on the public lands where they
lived” to obtain judicial orders to “remove cows from hundreds of
miles of vulnerable desert streams” in order to protect species like
the southwestern willow flycatcher. 96 CBD also successfully
ended “major timber operations through-out Arizona and New
Mexico and brought an end to large-scale industrial logging in the
heritage public lands of the arid Southwest” in order to protect
threatened goshawks and owls. 97
Finally, the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA) is a
“1,200-member grassroots organization” 98 that works to protect
and restore the biological integrity of Oregon’s desert
ecosystems. 99 This has been accomplished by advocating that
desert ecosystems receive congressional wilderness designations
and protection pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964. 100 When
the BLM refuses to propose such designations, ONDA litigates to
force the issue. 101

92. Id. See also Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2008).
93. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Contact Us, http://www
.biologicaldiversity.org/about/contact/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
94. Center for Biological Diversity, Support, Support the Center, http://www.
biologicaldiversity.org/support/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
95. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Contact Us, supra note
93.
96. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Our Story, http://www.
biologicaldiversity.org/about/story/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
97. Id.
98. Oregon Natural Desert Association, About Us, http://www.onda.org/about
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
99. Id.
100. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
101. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 451 F.Supp.2d
1202 (D. Or. 2006) [hereinafter ONDA v. Rasmussen].
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B. Environmental Organization Interests in Public
Rangeland
Rangeland protection organizations consider overgrazing
such a problem because it greatly damages grassland flora and
fauna. For CBD, the increased defoliation and plant tramp-ling
that leads to soil erosion and water sedimentation threatens
many species of grassland herbivores, avian predators, and
fish. 102 For ONDA, overgrazing damages an already delicate
high desert ecosystem. 103 Overgrazing depletes desert grasses
and vegetation, and the lack of moisture serves as an impediment
to their quick renewal. 104 Once the vegetation is removed, what
little nutrients exist in the soil are quickly lost to wind erosion. 105
For some organizations like WildEarth Guardians, the interest in
overgrazing is twofold: (1) prevent loss of habitat for native flora
and fauna; and (2) prevent the degradation of a resource designed
and dedicated to the continuing maintenance of public schools. 106
If overgrazing is such a major environmental problem, one
might ask why ranchers and ranching organizations allow it to
happen since it affects them too. There is no easy answer, but the
principles outlined in the “Tragedy of the Commons” concept may
explain why ranchers and ranching organizations have allowed
overgrazing. 107 There are vast acreages of public land in the

102. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing,
supra note 11; see generally NAT’L RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE,
LIVESTOCK GRAZING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (2009), http://www.earthjustice.
org/library/factsheets/grazing_enviro_effects.pdf.
103. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing,
supra note 11.
104. Id.
105. NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRIC., RANGELAND
SOIL QUALITY—WIND EROSION 2 (2001), http://soils. usda.gov/SQI/management/
files/RSQIS10.pdf.
106. See generally Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); see also Idaho
Watersheds Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 367 (Idaho 1999)
[hereinafter IWP II].
107. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243, 1243-48 (1968). The “Tragedy of the Commons” is a process by which
multiple individuals will independently and rationally act in their own interests
to destroy a finite public resource, even if this destruction damages everyone in
the long-term. Id.

13

POOL

338

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

western U.S., 108 so ranchers may believe that they could always
move their herds onto another grazing allotment if the one they
use becomes overgrazed and can no longer sustain large herds. 109
Because the ranchers do not own the public land, there may be no
real incentive to prevent degradation. 110
IV. GRAZING LEASE LITIGATION PROBLEM
Even though overgrazing is a serious environmental problem,
rangeland protection organizations’ litigation to take grazing
leases away from those who allow overgrazing has arguably
become a bigger problem because it has created a public relations
nightmare. 111 On state owned rangeland, environmental
organizations have litigated to prevent overgrazing and to ensure
that school-trust land is healthy enough to support the public
schools into the distant future. 112 On BLM land, ranching
organizations have litigated furiously to prevent any reform of
federal rangeland management, and environmental organizations
have responded with lawsuits to remove livestock to protect
ecosystem health. 113 Finally, on Forest Service land,
environmental organizations have litigated to simply prevent any
grazing leases from going to ranchers who overgraze. 114

108. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, About
the BLM, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2009); see U.S. Forest Service, Why does the forest service permit livestock
grazing on NFS land?, supra note 71.
109. Hardin, supra note 107, at 2.
110. Id. at 2.
111. See generally ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16.
112. Id. See, e.g., Press Release, WildEarth Guardians, Cattle Grazing on
Public Lands Must Account for Endangered Wildlife: 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals Sides with Conservationists (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.
wildearthguardians.org/library/paper.asp?nMode=1&nLibraryID=356; see also
Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001).
113. See generally Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000)
[hereinafter Public Lands Council III].
114. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 2008); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, No. Civ. 05-0372
JBDJS, 2005 WL 3663717 (D. N.M. Dec. 13, 2005).
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A. Arizona School-Trust Land Grazing Litigation
In Arizona, environmental organizations historically have
not had much success in preventing ranchers’ livestock from
overgrazing on school-trust land. 115 This pattern of failure 116
changed dramatically in 2001 with the landmark Arizona
Supreme Court ruling in Guardians v. Wells. 117 In this case,
Forest Guardians and Jonathan Tate applied for two different
grazing leases of school-trust land. Forest Guardians applied for
a “ten-year lease on approximately 5,000 acres of school-trust
grazing land” in Coconino County, Arizona, and 162 acres in
Santa Cruz County, which was at the other end of the state. 118
Tate applied for almost 16,000 acres of school-trust grazing land
in Pinal County, Arizona, north of Tucson. 119 Both Forest
Guardians and Tate offered to pay double the amount offered by
the then-current lessees when the leases came up for renewal. 120
Both parties informed the Commissioner of the SLD that the
leased land would not be grazed; instead, it would be “rested” for
the entire period of the lease so that it could recover from
apparent overgrazing by the then-current and previous lessees. 121
The Commissioner subsequently denied both of these
applications. 122 After an arduous appeals process, the Arizona
Supreme Court concluded that the Commissioner had ignored his
constitutional duty to consider whether the high bids were in the
best interest of the trust 123 and determined that environmental
organizations in Arizona could bid on and be awarded grazing
leases with the intention of letting the land rest for the entirety of
the lease. 124

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Guardians, 34 P.3d at 364.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 366-77 (Ariz. 2001).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 371-73.

15

POOL

340

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

B. Idaho Public School Land Endowment Grazing
Litigation
The environmental litigation over grazing leases in Idaho is
much more complicated than that in Arizona. IWP and later
WWP have undertaken much of the litigation. 125 In Idaho,
litigation over grazing leases on public school land functionally
began in 1993. 126 On Sept. 23 of that year, rancher William E.
Ingram filed an application with the Idaho SBLC to renew his
640-acre grazing lease. 127 At the same time, IWP filed an
application to lease the same land subdivision. 128 After a
contentious auctioning process, in which IWP was the high-bidder
for the lease, the SBLC awarded the lease to Ingram. 129 IWP
appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court eventually held that the
SBLC failed to “provide for the location, protection, sale, or rental
of all the lands . . . in such manner as will secure the maximum
long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or
to the state if not specifically granted.” 130 The court also used the
legislature’s authority, as granted by Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution, and case law to determine that any bids on grazing
leases must be for the “greatest possible amount for the lease of
school lands for the benefit of school funds.” 131 Subsequently, the
court reversed the decision of the SBLC and ordered that new bid
auctions take place so that the high-bidder could be awarded the
lease. 132
In 1999, IWP was again involved in litigation because it was
prevented from bidding on grazing leases. 133 After IWP’s victory
in 1996, the Idaho Legislature amended the Idaho Code by
adding a provision that required that the SBLC weigh the benefit
125. See Western Watersheds Project, WWP Litigation, http://westernwater
sheds.org/legal/legal.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
126. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1206.
127. Id. at 1207.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1208.
130. Id. at 1209 (quoting IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8).
131. Id. at 1209-10 (citing IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8, also citing East Side
Blaine County Livestock Ass’n v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 198 P. 760 (Idaho
1921).
132. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1211-12.
133. IWP II, supra note 106, at 367-69.
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of lease bids for the schools, the state’s interest in a healthy
ranching industry, and the increased tax revenue from such
industry. 134 The Idaho Supreme Court held that this provision
was unconstitutional with Article IX, Section 8 of the state
constitution 135 and ordered that new auctions be held so that
IWP could participate. 136
C. BLM Litigation
Grazing lease litigation on BLM land took a markedly
different path from comparable litigation on state rangeland
because BLM is a federal agency. On BLM land, ranching
organizations brought roughly half of the major lawsuits in
response to federal rangeland regulatory reforms. Environmental
organizations brought lawsuits largely in response to the
eventual failure of these regulatory reforms and focused on
removing livestock from BLM land that the organizations
believed should receive wilderness designations. In order to
understand why the litigation occurred, one must be thoroughly
familiar with the rangeland management reform process
undertaken during the 1990s.
1. Rangeland Reform ’94
Although Congress passed both FLPMA137 and PRIA 138 in
order to improve rangeland management, these Acts were only
modestly successful. The BLM has consistently “failed to exercise
its modest authority to limit the ecological damage inflicted by
In 1993, the Clinton Administration
intensive grazing.” 139
Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, attempted to address
this continuing environmental damage through the development

134. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra
note 106.
135. IWP II, supra note 106, at 369.
136. Id. at 371.
137. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011787 (2006).
138. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908
(2006).
139. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 50-51.
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of Rangeland Reform ’94, 140 the “first significant proposal to
reform grazing practices since the enactment of PRIA in 1978.” 141
Rangeland Reform ’94 was designed to implement regulations
whereby domestic livestock would be “managed to minimize their
detrimental impact on federal rangeland.” 142 The proposed
regulatory changes purported “(1) to improve administration of
the BLM grazing program, (2) to restore and improve the
ecological condition of the rangeland, and (3) to establish a ‘fair
and equitable grazing fee.’” 143 Rangeland Reform ’94’s proposed
implementation of national standards and guidelines were
designed to ensure that “grazing did not interfere with properly
functioning ecosystems,” 144 and the proposed increase in grazing
fees “attempted to establish a fee structure that would result,
over the course of three years, in a fee that more closely
represented the fair market value of the forage on federal
land.” 145
Ranchers and ranching organizations reacted negatively to
the proposed reforms 146 and believed that they would end private
grazing on BLM land. 147 Babbitt successfully negotiated a
compromise with Congressional Democrats in order to pass
Rangeland Reform ’94 as part of an appropriations bill. 148
Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives easily passed the
bill, but western Senators, frustrated and angered by the
proposed regulations, “successfully filibustered and prevented the
Senate from considering the range reforms attached to [it].” 149
On November 9, 1993, the western Senators removed the
rangeland reforms from the appropriations bill, and Babbitt was
forced to pursue an administrative reform solution. 150

140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 52-53.
142. Id. at 59-60.
143. Id. at 62.
144. Id. at 64.
145. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 65.
146. See Valerie Richardson, Babbitt's “Green” Policies Provoke Anger in West,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at A1.
147. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 66.
148. Id. at 66-7.
149. Id. at 67.
150. Id.
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The BLM promulgated the proposed administrative
rangeland reform regulations on March 25, 1994, in a somewhat
weaker form than they had appeared in the defeated legislative
effort. 151 After extensive public comment, the BLM promulgated
the final rangeland reform regulations on February 22, 1995. 152
The final regulations were quite different than the proposed
rules. First, the “proposed grazing-fee increase was eliminated
from the final version.” 153 In addition, the effective date of the
regulations was delayed by six months, ensuring that “[they]
would not apply to the 1995 grazing season.” 154 This meant that
ranchers and ranching associations had almost a year to
persuade the friendlier Republican Congress to pass a legislative
override of the rangeland reform regulations. 155 However, the
Fundamentals of Rangeland Health (FRH), a key component of
Rangeland Reform ’94, 156 were part of the final regulations. The
FRH allowed the BLM to “modify grazing practices” to restore
and protect proper watershed function, endangered species
habitat, and ecological processes. 157 Finally, “the authorized
officer [would] take appropriate action” 158 whenever “ecological
conditions [were] not being met.” 159 After prospects faded for a
legislative override of the rangeland reform regulations, 160
ranching interests prepared to overturn them through the
judiciary. 161
2. Ranching Organization Litigation Over
151. Id. at 70; see also Grazing Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed.
Reg. 14,314 (proposed Mar. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780,
4100).
152. See Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed.
Reg. 9894 (proposed Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100).
153. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 73.
154. Id. at 74.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Public Lands Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior Sec’y, 929 F. Supp. 1436,
1448 (D. Wyo. 1996) [hereinafter Public Lands Council I]; see also Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9898 (Feb.
22, 1995); see also 43 C.F.R § 4180.1 (1995).
158. 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995).
159. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 75.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 75-76.
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Regulatory Reform
The Public Lands Council, a ranching association, and
several other grazing organizations filed suit against Babbitt in
order to declare that ten provisions of the rangeland reform
regulations were an arbitrary and capricious exercise of Babbitt’s
authority as Secretary of the Interior. 162 The District Court in
Wyoming upheld six of the ten challenged provisions—including
the FRH provision—as valid exercises of Babbitt’s statutory
authority163 under the TGA. 164 Babbitt appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, which held that three of the four provisions ruled
unconstitutional by the District Court were, in fact, also valid
When Public Lands Council
exercises of his authority. 165
appealed to the Supreme Court, the court “unanimously rejected
[the appeal] and affirmed the Tenth Circuit.” 166 After nearly five
years of litigation, almost all of the Rangeland Reform ‘94
regulations went fully into effect on May 15, 2000—just a few
months before President Clinton left office. As will be discussed
in greater detail in Section V(C) below, these regulations were
eventually overturned
during the
George
W.
Bush
Administration.
3. Environmental Organization Litigation Over
BLM Grazing Rights
Since the failure of Rangeland Reform ‘94, environmental
organizations like ONDA and WWP have attempted to meet the
principles outlined in the FRH through litigation to remove
livestock from portions of BLM land. 167 In Oregon Natural Desert
Association v. Bureau of Land Management, 168 ONDA filed a
162. Public Lands Council III, supra note 113, at 744, 748, 750, 752; see Nicoll,
supra note 44, at 76.
163. See generally Public Lands Council I, supra note 157, at 1451.
164. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (2006).
165. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Public Lands Council II].
166. Nicoll, supra, note 44, at 787; See Public Lands Council III, supra note
113, at 750.
167. See generally ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101, at 1202; see also
Western Watersheds Project v. Bennett, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (D. Id.
2005).
168. ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101.
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lawsuit against the BLM, the Secretary of the Interior, and
several local BLM managers to stop a proposed riparian
remediation construction project on BLM rangeland in Oregon. 169
In 1998, the BLM determined that the East-West Gulch in the
Beaty Butte Allotment was “failing to meet federal rangeland
The BLM concluded, however, that
health standards.” 170
livestock grazing in the area did not significantly affect the
declining rangeland health. 171 The BLM subsequently developed
an action plan that was designed to restore the East-West Gulch
through the construction of a series of livestock improvements
and road relocation from the riparian floodplain to a nearby
ridge. 172 ONDA objected to the construction and preferred that
livestock grazing be reduced or ended as an alternative method
ONDA performed a wilderness
for riparian restoration. 173
inventory of the area pursuant to agency protocols, determined
that multiple wilderness resources might be jeopardized by the
construction projects, and submitted it to the BLM. When the
BLM refused to alter or halt the action plan, ONDA filed suit.
Important to this comment is ONDA’s contention that the BLM
violated its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 174
requirements when it “did not consider the full range of
alternatives to its proposed action” 175 and when it “failed to
consider new information on wilderness resources.” 176 The
District Court held that the BLM was “obligated under NEPA to
consider whether there were changes in, or additions to, the
wilderness values within the East-West Gulch and whether the
proposed action in that area might negatively impact those
wilderness values.” 177 However, the District Court also ruled
that the BLM had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner by not considering in greater detail the reduction of

169. Id. at 1205, 1207.
170. Id. at 1206.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1207.
173. Id.
174. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361
(2006).
175. ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101, at 1207.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1213.
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grazing in the East-West Gulch. 178 Once the District Court had
ruled in its favor, however, ONDA was able to request and receive
a judicial stay on any additional BLM construction in the EastWest Gulch until such time as a proper environmental
assessment and wilderness inventory had been performed. 179
This meant that in a new assessment and inventory, the BLM
could potentially consider reduction in livestock grazing as an
alternative method for riparian restoration that would preserve
wilderness resources.
D. U.S. Forest Service Litigation
Unlike that on state or BLM rangeland, environmental
organization grazing lease litigation with regard to Forest Service
land is often unsuccessful. 180 Occasionally, however, environmental organizations do find some success when pursuing
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 181 claims. In Forest Guardians v.
U.S. Forest Service, 182 Forest Guardians brought suit against the
Forest Service, alleging violations of the ESA for failure to adhere
to a 1993 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) Recovery Plan for
the threatened Mexican spotted owl 183 in parts of eleven national
forests in Arizona and New Mexico. 184 In response to the FWS
Recovery Plan, the Forest Service in 1996 “developed
178. Id. at 1214.
179. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91648
(D. Or. Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter ONDA v. Rasmussen II].
180. See generally League of Wilderness Defenders v. U.S. Forest Serv., 549
F.3d 1211 (D. Or. 2008) (holding that the Forest Service’s Final Environmental
Impact Statement for allowing commercial logging adequately evaluated the
cumulative effects of past and present grazing); see generally Oregon Natural
Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
effluents from livestock were not a point source within the meaning of the Clean
Water Act, and, therefore, no state certification was required for issuance of
livestock grazing permit).
181. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
182. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV 00-612-TUC-RCC,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25440 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2002).
183. Id. at *5.
184. Press Release, EarthJustice, Court Rules National Forest Grazing Illegal,
Judge Rules National Forest Livestock Grazing Program in New Mexico and
Arizona Threatens Mexican Spotted Owl, Violates ESA (Oct. 17, 2002), available
at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/002/court_rules_national_forest_graz
ing_illegal.html.
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amendments . . . to their Forest Plans for the eleven national
forests in the Southwest Region.” 185 The amendments required
that the Forest Service “monitor forage use by livestock and other
animals in ‘key forage monitoring areas’ and to ensure that forage
use does not exceed forage utilization standards during the
growing season.” 186 The Forest Service intended to modify its
management practices prior to the 1996 amendments, so it
consulted with the FWS in order to determine whether the new
practices would negatively affect the owl. 187 The FWS then
issued two biological opinions whereby it determined that the
1996 amendments would comply with the ESA and that the pre1996 practices would not. 188
The District Court held that the Forest Service subsequently
did not implement the standards outlined in the 1996
amendments and was in violation of the ESA because it failed to
alert the FWS that implementation would not proceed
Because the Forest Service was not in
immediately. 189
compliance with the ESA, the court subsequently ordered all
livestock removed from the eleven national forests and ordered
the Forest Service to “consult with the [FWS] to determine
whether the federally protected owls need additional
protections.” 190
As demonstrated above, environmental organizations have
achieved some great successes in removing or limiting livestock
on state owned, BLM, and Forest Service rangeland. Because of
this success, grazing lease litigation has increased. As a result,
the ranching industry, the public, and legislative bodies have
developed an extremely negative perception of environmental
organizations.

185. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25440, at
*4 (D. Ariz, Oct. 16, 2002).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at *5.
189. Id. at *21.
190. Press Release, Earthjustice, Court Orders Cows Off of Essential Mexican
Spotted Owl Habitat, Southwest Cattle Grazing Harming Mexican Spotted
Owls, (Nov. 26, 2002), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/002/
court_ orders_cows_off_of_essential_mexican_spotted_owl_habitat.html.
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V. REACTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS’ LITIGATION
While reduction of overgrazing is a laudable goal, the
litigation employed by rangeland protection organizations to
achieve it has created a publicity nightmare. Ranchers and other
landowners have become increasingly hostile to the environmental organizations’ interests and activities because they have
been excluded from the public land they have used for
generations, and the legislatures in several states have been
pressured by ranching associations to help protect them from
This
unwanted assault by environmental organizations. 191
pressure usually results in state legislatures passing either laws
that make it financially more difficult for environmental
organizations to outbid ranchers on grazing leases 192 or
constitutional amendments or laws that prevent environmental
organizations’ bids from being considered in the first place. 193
Finally, ranching associations have pressured federal agencies
like the BLM to dismantle much of the regulatory reform that
enabled environmental organizations’ legal victories on federal
rangeland.
A. Landowner Reaction
The ranchers who have lost grazing leases are understandably very upset by environmental organizations’ success 194 because their families generally have grazed their livestock for
generations on public rangeland grazing leases. 195 Ranchers
have had to increase the size of their herds just to compete and
earn a living. 196 Unfortunately, as described above, increasing

191. Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359, 365.
192. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-284(B) (2002), amended by 2002 Ariz. Legis.
Serv. ch. 204 (West).
193. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra
note 106.
194. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16.
195. Id.
196. See generally Tim Heardan, Ranchers May Face Tough Times, CAPITAL
PRESS , Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.klamathbucketbrigade.org/Capital
Press_Ranchersmayfacetoughtimes010909.htm.
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herd size leads to overgrazing and rangeland degradation. 197
Often, the court-ordered removal of livestock from a grazing lease
will jeopardize ranchers’ entire livelihoods. 198 Once a court
grants an environmental organization a legal victory as in
Guardians v. Wells 199 in Arizona, it sets a legal precedent that
could cause more ranchers to lose their leases. 200
B. Legislative Reaction
In Arizona, the SLD has sided with ranchers throughout its
existence, 201 and although the Arizona Supreme Court has since
held that environmental organizations like WildEarth Guardians
may bid on grazing leases, the decision has not radically changed
the policies or preferences of the SLD. 202 The court’s holding
definitely did not change the “political environment in which the
agency operates,” and the Arizona Legislature is “even more
adverse to change than [the SLD].” 203 In 2002, the legislature
amended several sections of the Arizona Revised Statutes in
response to Guardians v. Wells 204 so that successful bidders have
to pay for improvements installed by previous lessees. 205 For
environmental organizations like WildEarth Guardians, this
legislation presents a problem with bidding on grazing leases
because the improvements can be prohibitively expensive and

197. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing,
supra note 11; see generally General Concepts Related to Overgrazing,
http://people.oregonstate.edu/~muirp/genconce.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2009);
see generally NAT ’L RES . DEFENSE C OUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 102,
at 1; see generally NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., RANGELAND SOIL QUALITY—
WIND EROSION, supra note 105, at 1.
198. See Scotta Callister, Ranchers Seek Smith’s Help in Grazing Battle, BLUE
MOUNTAIN EAGLE, Aug. 20, 2008, at 1-2.
199. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001).
200. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16, at 2.
201. Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. An Act Amending Sections 37-284, 37-322.01 and 37-322.03, 2002 Ariz.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 204 (S.B. 1274) (West); Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359;
Guardians, 34 P.3d at 364.
205. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-284(C) (2002), amended by 2002 Ariz. Legis.
Serv. ch. 204 (West).
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make it impossible to obtain the lease. 206 If an environmental
organization is not able to pay for the cost of non-removable
improvements installed by the previous lessee, then the lease is
awarded to the next best bidder, which would be the other party
contesting the lease—the current lessee. 207
As mentioned above, the Idaho Legislature amended the
Idaho Code to prevent organizations like IWP from obtaining
grazing leases in order to let the land “rest.” 208 After the Idaho
SBLC used this provision to reject IWP’s grazing lease high bid
for the second time, IWP was forced to file another lawsuit to
acquire the lease. 209 The Idaho Legislature adopted a resolution
in 1998 that proposed to amend the section of the Idaho
Constitution that allowed IWP to prevail in 1996.
The
amendment changed the word “disposal” in the section to “sale” in
reference to the disposition of trust lands in Section 8. 210 This
changed the whole meaning of the sentence upon which the Idaho
Supreme Court relied in its 1996 decision—the new language
would prevent the legislature from stipulating that the schooltrust land could be leased in such a way so that it could provide a
benefit to the schools. 211 Once restricted to sales alone, IWP and
other like-minded environmental organizations would no longer
be able to apply for and be awarded grazing leases under Section
8 of the state constitution. 212 Idaho voters approved this
amendment in the general election of November 3, 1998. 213
However, the court overturned the amendment because of a
procedural technicality, 214 and the legislature has not yet acted to
readopt it.
206. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-284(C), 37-322, 37-322.01, 37322.02, 37-322.03 (2008).
207. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16, at 2.
208. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra
note 106.
209. Id. at 370-71.
210. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1998), invalidated by Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 358 (Idaho 1999) [hereinafter
IWP III].
211. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1209.
212. See generally IWP III, supra note 210.
213. Id. at 360.
214. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 2 (providing that “[i]f two (2) or more amendments are proposed, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors
shall vote for or against each of them separately”).
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C. Agency Reaction to BLM Grazing Reform
The inauguration of George W. Bush on January 20, 2001
marked the end of Rangeland Reform ‘94. Even though Public
Lands Council v. Babbitt III 215 had been decided only a few
months before, President Bush campaigned on a platform
“promising to limit the federal government’s intrusion into
extraction activities.” 216 On January 30, 2003, BLM Director
Kathleen Clarke promised to rewrite the BLM grazing
regulations. 217 When the BLM promulgated its final regulations
on July 12, 2006, 218 it undid almost all of the reform instituted in
1995. 219 In particular, the BLM modified the FRH guidelines so
that they “no longer have any direct effect on the management of
BLM rangeland.” 220 In effect, grazing practices and regulations
exist as they did prior to Babbitt’s efforts at reform.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS INVOLVING
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Because grazing lease litigation by environmental
organizations has created such negative reactions from
landowners, legislatures, and federal agencies, the only effective
way to solve the problem is to reduce the amount of litigation.
One way to achieve this goal is through Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR), whereby “a neutral third party participates to
assist in the resolution of issues in controversy, through processes
such as early neutral evaluation, mediation, mini-trial, and
arbitration.” 221 When used to resolve environmental disputes,
however, ADR has also been referred to as Environmental
Conflict Resolution, or ECR. 222 Because environmental and
ranching organizations have been especially litigious in
215. Public Lands Council III, supra note 113.
216. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 97.
217. Id. at 98.
218. See Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed.
Reg. 39,402 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).
219. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 99.
220. Id. at 105.
221. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (2006).
222. Joseph A. Siegel, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental
Enforcement Cases: A Call for Enhanced Assessment and Greater Use, 24 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 189 (2007).
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attempting to resolve grazing lease disputes 223 and because the
litigation itself takes years to reach completion, 224 ADR is an
efficient avenue for conflict resolution. 225 ADR has worked to
resolve major environmental disputes between a wide variety of
stakeholders, and it can work with parties regarding grazing
lease disputes as well. 226 Therefore, state legislatures and
Congress should enact laws that authorize and encourage grazing
lease disputes to be funneled into ADR systems, and the BLM
and Forest Service should renew their commitment to negotiated
rulemaking so that ADR is again emphasized for agency
rulemaking and adjudication.
A. Environmental Disputes Resolved Through ADR
ADR has been used successfully to resolve a number of
environmental disputes, and it is often used when resolving land
use conflicts. 227 In these types of conflicts, multiple stakeholders,
each with different concerns and objectives, are usually involved.
Because of the sheer number of differing objectives among the
parties, litigation can be both time-consuming and costly. 228
However, by using ADR, stakeholders are generally able to
reduce both litigation time and legal expense. 229 For example, in
a dispute over a proposed dam on the Snoqualmie River in
Washington, “environmental advocates opposed the project because of their concern over the survival of the river’s ecosystem;
farmers were concerned about proposed reductions in water for
irrigation; and citizens worried about the potential for
uncontrolled suburban sprawl.” 230 Instead of litigation, the
223. See Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); see also IWP I, supra
note 14, at 1206; see IWP II, supra note 106, at 367; see also Public Lands
Council III, supra note 113, at 728.
224. See, e.g., IWP I, supra note 14, at 1206; see also IWP II, supra note 106, at
367.
225. See Siegel, supra note 222, at 197.
226. See John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning: The
Role of Lawyers in Resolving Environmental Interest Disputes, Contexts for
Resolving Environmental Interest Conflicts and Disputes, 37 REAL EST. L. J. 73,
76 (2008).
227. Id. at 76, 77.
228. See Siegel, supra note 222, at 197.
229. Id.
230. See Nolon & Bacher, supra note 226, at 76.
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parties agreed to mediation by two facilitators, 231 and “the
parties implemented many of the land use recommendations that
were agreed upon and formed a basin-wide coordinating council
In Southern
that continued operating for ten years.” 232
California, urban sprawl and development threatened to impair
or eliminate the last of the “coastal sage scrub habitat, [which
was] vital to the survival of a number of species endemic to the
area.” Utilizing a voluntary Natural Communities Conservation
Planning (NCCP) scheme, developers, landowners, and local
officials successfully created a development plan that set aside
“large core habitat reserves and wildlife corridors” and set “tough
development limits” in buffer areas around protected habitat
cores. 233 While this land use dispute did not come to litigation,
the parties recognized that “legal proceedings would likely be too
rigid, time consuming, costly, and inadequate” to resolve the
conflict. 234 As these examples show, ADR can effectively and
efficiently resolve environmental disputes, and, therefore, it
should be used to resolve grazing lease disputes as well.
B. State and Federal Statutory Schemes
As explained above, most grazing lease litigation in state
courts occurs because of disputes over the school-trust
endowment land granted to states when they were admitted into
the U.S. Because Congress has no police power, it cannot force
the individual states to adopt and enforce statutes that require
ADR in all grazing lease litigation. 235 However, Congress could
encourage states to enact such legislation through its spending
power 236 and could condition receipt of funds for a national
project on such enactment. 237 Furthermore, the fundamental
231. Id.
232. Id. at 76-77.
233. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural
Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811, 816
(2008).
234. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on
Collaborative Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835, 841
(2008).
235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9.
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
237. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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right to justice would be frustrated if states forced parties to
grazing lease conflicts into ADR. 238
However, a state statutory scheme promoting and
encouraging parties to mediate grazing lease conflicts could be
established. Under such a scheme, a state legislature would craft
a bill authorizing ADR in its courts in a manner similar 239 to the
authorization in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
(ADR Act). 240 The legislature could then draft the statute so that
there were positive incentives for parties to utilize ADR processes
like mediation, arbitration, and binding arbitration.
The
incentives could be: drastically reduced court fees and processing
time, immediate access to a qualified official mediator or arbiter,
or even a stipend, tax write-off, or other financial bonus directed
to the parties in exchange for their use of an ADR solution
instead of insisting on a trial. The same could be done with
negative financial incentives to prevent parties from choosing
trial over the ADR system, but these might be more difficult to
enact and enforce than positive incentives. While some of these
strategies—especially that of the negative financial incentive to
participate in ADR—may be difficult to enact, the benefits of a
less-cluttered case docket and less hostility between
environmental organizations and ranching interests may
outweigh any potential legislative difficulties.
A statutory scheme for the federal courts might not be as
difficult to establish as it would be in the individual states.
Congress already has an ADR Act, 241 so ADR has been
authorized and encouraged in federal courts. 242 It would be a
relatively simple matter to amend the ADR Act to include the
same positive and negative incentives outlined above to
encourage parties to grazing lease litigation to use the ADR
system already in place. However, grazing lease litigation is
generally only a problem in the western U.S., and
Representatives and Senators from the rest of the country might
be disinclined to vote for such an amendment. Political ideologies
could also come into play just as they did in the legislative defeat
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (2006).
Id. §§ 651-58.
Id.
Id. § 651(a).
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of Rangeland Reform ‘94. The best method for passage would
involve compromise on both sides of the political spectrum.
Proponents of the legislation might need to assure conservative
members that it is intended to reduce court costs and clear the
court dockets, not to deny ranchers’ rights or abilities to graze on
public rangeland, and proponents should also assure liberal
members that the legislation would not remove or hamper
environmental organizations’ ability to stop ecological damage
caused by overgrazing.
C. Renewed Agency Commitment to Negotiated
Rulemaking
During the 1980’s, federal agencies like the BLM and Forest
Service embraced negotiated rulemaking, which is sometimes
called “regulatory negotiation” or “reg-neg,” as an “alternative to
traditional procedures for drafting proposed regulations.” 243
Under negotiated rulemaking, “the agency, with the assistance of
one or more neutral advisers known as ‘convenors,’ assembles a
committee of representatives of all affected interests to negotiate
a proposed rule . . . to reach consensus on a text that all parties
can accept.” 244 Therefore, negotiated rulemaking is a method by
which agencies can avoid much of the conflict between parties
affected by the rule and the subsequent litigation they use to
obtain relief. 245 Unfortunately, even though negotiated rulemaking is supported and encouraged by the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990, 246 federal agencies have used it with
much less frequency over the past decade because of declining
budgets and agency reorganization during the George W. Bush
Administration, among other factors. 247 Generally, agencies no
Because
longer voluntarily use negotiated rulemaking. 248
regulations governing grazing on BLM and Forest Service land
have proven to be very contentious, reestablishing and increasing

243. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate)
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008).
244. Id. at 988.
245. Id. at 991.
246. Id. at 989; Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561-570 (2006).
247. See Lubbers, supra note 243, at 996-1005.
248. Id. at 1004.
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negotiated rulemaking in these agencies could significantly
reduce grazing lease litigation by bringing environmental
organizations and ranching interests together to draft grazing
regulations that protect both rangeland health and the ranching
way of life.
VII. CONCLUSION
Grazing lease litigation is a pervasive problem in the western
U.S., and environmental organizations have seen great success in
wresting grazing leases away from ranchers. However, this has
created a public relations nightmare and has provoked strong
legislative and regulatory reactions against environmental
organizations. Efforts to reform the public grazing system to
promote rangeland health have failed, and no viable solution
currently exists. Rangeland Reform ’94 was too limited and
watered-down to effectuate the change necessary to prevent the
grazing lease cases from clogging western court dockets. A
Rangeland Reform ’10 legislative package of amendments to the
ADR Act to implement the state and federal statutory schemes
outlined in this comment combined with a renewed agency
commitment to negotiated rulemaking could result in an end to
grazing lease litigation, as we have known it.
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